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Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy 
Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman 
abstract.  In How to Save the Supreme Court, we identified the legitimacy challenge facing the 
Court, traced it to a set of structural flaws, and proposed novel reforms. Little more than a year 
later, the conversation around Supreme Court reform has only grown louder and more urgent. In 
this Essay, we continue that conversation by engaging with critics of our approach. The current 
crisis of the Supreme Court is, we argue, inextricable from the question of the Supreme Court’s 
proper role in our democracy. For those interested in reform, there are three distinct strategies for 
ensuring the Supreme Court maintains its proper role relative to democracy: internal restraints, 
external constraints, and structural reforms. We argue that internal restraints and external con-
straints both suffer from serious drawbacks as strategies for restraining the Court. Structural re-
forms remain the most promising option for reforming—and saving—the Supreme Court.   
introduction 
Fundamental reforms to the Supreme Court were once the exclusive domain 
of scholars of constitutional design and theory. But in recent months, they have 
become a major part of policy debates as many point to a legitimacy crisis en-
gulfing the Court. Underscoring the shift, both Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, as 
candidates for president and vice president in 2020, would not say whether Dem-
ocrats would expand the size of the Supreme Court.1 Then-candidate Biden an-
nounced instead that, if elected, he would create a bipartisan commission that 
 
1. See Amy B. Wang, Biden, Harris Won’t Say Whether They Would ‘Pack’ the Court, Drawing Re-
publican Criticism, WASH. POST (Oct, 8, 2020, 7:18 PM PDT), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/politics/2020/10/08/republicans-continue-attacking-biden-harris-over-hypothetical 
-court-packing-question [https://perma.cc/WF5F-S4T3]. 
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would provide “recommendations as to how to reform the court system.”2 Such 
developments would have been unimaginable just a few years ago, as “packing” 
the Supreme Court was long seen as a third rail in American politics.3 Clearly, 
the Overton Window4 has shifted—dramatically. 
To be sure, major reform remains unlikely in the near term. Although the 
Democrats now control both the Presidency and Congress, the Senate is closely 
divided, likely dashing liberals’ hopes for Court expansion and other bold initi-
atives.5 Nonetheless, the dramatic change in the plausibility of Supreme Court 
reform is striking. What changed? The most immediate answer turns on politics. 
Republicans refused in 2016 to give a hearing to President Obama’s nominee, 
Judge Merrick Garland, on the grounds that it was an election year. Democrats 
were outraged at this break from norms and were apoplectic over Republicans’ 
bare-knuckle tactics in confirming three of President Trump’s appointees to the 
Court—and, in particular, over their hypocrisy in confirming then-Judge Amy 
Coney Barrett mere days before the presidential election. Facing a solid 6-3 con-
servative majority on the Court—and thus the possibility of their legislative, reg-
ulatory, and policy preferences being blocked for a generation—progressives and 
Democrats increasingly question the legitimacy of the Court and call for its re-
form.6 Republicans, for their part, say Democrats are the ones threatening the 
 
2. Sarah Mucha, Biden Says if Elected He Will Form Bipartisan Commission to Recommend Changes 
to Supreme Court, CNN (Oct. 22, 2020, 9:53 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/22 
/politics/biden-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/2NFE-APTW]. 
3. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2014) 
(“‘Court packing’ is especially out of bounds.”). 
4. See Nathan J. Russell, An Introduction to the Overton Window of Political Possibilities, MACKINAC 
CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y (Jan. 4, 2006), https://www.mackinac.org/7504 [https://perma.cc 
/2GW7-CMKV]. 
5. See, e.g., Steven Teles, Our Political System Is Unfair. Liberals Need to Just Deal with It., N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/opinion/democrats 
-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/87M7-JWNC] (arguing that the Senate’s composition 
“makes deep structural reform of federal institutions impossible”). Formally, the Senate’s 
fifty-fifty split puts Democrats in control, with Vice President Harris as the tiebreaker. See 
Natalie Andrews, What Happens When the Senate Is Split 50-50?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:38 
PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-happens-if-the-senate-is-split-50-50-after 
-the-georgia-runoffs-11609965242 [https://perma.cc/7TN8-28PD]. But the split leaves no 
margin for error, and at least one Democratic Senator has already made clear that he opposes 
expanding the Supreme Court. See Veronica Stracqualursi, Centrist Democrat Says He Won’t 
Back Expanding Supreme Court, CNN (Nov. 10, 2020, 10:50 AM ET), https://www.cnn 
.com/2020/11/10/politics/joe-manchin-supreme-court-packing-cnntv/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/T2WY-JGV3]. 
6. See, e.g., Daniel Villarreal, Joe Biden Under Pressure from Democrats to Publicly Embrace Supreme 
Court Packing Plan, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 8, 2020, 10:27 PM EDT), https://www.newsweek 
.com/joe-biden-under-pressure-democrats-publicly-embrace-supreme-court-packing-plan 
-1537691 [https://perma.cc/9AFC-8TX4]. 
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Court’s legitimacy by calling for Court expansion and other reforms simply be-
cause they are unhappy that Republicans have the advantage on the Court.7 
Whatever one makes of this immediate crisis, we think it is best understood 
as the current manifestation of a deeper problem. In 2019, we published How to 
Save the Supreme Court8 in this journal, identifying the legitimacy challenge fac-
ing the Court and tracing it to a set of structural flaws that are putting increasing 
strain on the Court and its role in our democracy. The problem, we argued, lies 
in the interaction between growing political polarization in the parties and con-
stitutional practices and traditions that are hard to justify. Lifetime appoint-
ments raise the stakes of individual Court nominations and turn essentially ran-
dom occurrences like the death of a Justice into watershed events that can 
reshape constitutional law for a generation. Confirmation battles have, as a re-
sult, become death matches, with each side seeking to politicize and bury the 
other’s picks. Moreover, the Court faces a growing democracy deficit: the Elec-
toral College and the role of the Senate in confirming would-be Justices mean 
that a majority of the Justices on the Court were nominated by presidents who 
initially lost the popular vote9 and four were confirmed by a narrow Senate ma-
jority that represents a minority of the U.S. population.10 In our earlier piece, we 
outlined two different ways to redesign the Supreme Court—what we called the 
Balanced Bench and the Lottery Court.11 Our aim was to offer structural pro-
posals that would address what we identified as the key legitimacy problems 
with the Court while being practically capable of implementation via ordinary 
statute. 
In the year-plus since our piece went to press, the “looming threat” to the 
Court’s legitimacy that we described has grown ever more apparent.12 And with 
 
7. See, e.g., Connor O’Brien, Sasse: ‘It’s Grotesque’ Biden and Dems Won’t Discuss ‘Suicide Bombing’ 
Court Packing, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2020, 11:13 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/news 
/2020/10/11/ben-sasse-supreme-court-packing-428633 [https://perma.cc/23AK-5K5X]. 
8. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148 (2019). 
9. See Ruth Marcus, Amy Coney Barrett Joins a Supreme Court That’s Largely Out of Step with the 




10. Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. See Adam Cole, The Supreme Court Is 
About to Hit an Undemocratic Milestone, VOX (Sept. 28, 2020, 3:00 AM EDT), https://www 
.vox.com/21456620/supreme-court-scotus-undemocratic-milestone-minority-rule [https:// 
perma.cc/2MNT-3LR4]. 
11. See Epps & Sitarman, supra note 8, at 181-205. 
12. See id. at 166. 
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it has grown interest in structural change to the Supreme Court.13 At the same 
time, commentators on both the left and the right have criticized our proposals. 
Some say we err by politicizing the Court too much;14 others accuse us of trying 
to depoliticize a fundamentally political institution.15 Some think that our 
changes are radical and unnecessary; others say that they do not go far enough 
to disempower or transform the Court.16 
In this Essay, we continue the conversation about Supreme Court reform by 
engaging with critics. Our goal, however, is not to defend our specific proposals, 
which we are content to let stand on their own merits. Nor will we seek to per-
suade readers of our diagnosis of the particulars of the legitimacy crisis facing 
the Court. Although we think that crisis has only worsened since we published 
our first piece, one’s assessment of the situation may be difficult to disentangle 
from how one feels about the current composition of the Court. 
Instead, we will start by trying to identify common ground with our critics 
in order to justify our general approach to structural reform of the Supreme 
Court. The current crisis of the Supreme Court is, we believe, inextricably linked 
to what is perhaps the central question in American constitutional law and the-
ory: what is the role of the Supreme Court in a democracy? For generations, this 
question has occupied constitutional scholars, who have debated why and when 
it is legitimate for unelected judges to overturn the will of majorities. Much of 
constitutional theory has amounted to an effort to find a principled way to solve 
this “countermajoritarian difficulty” and reconcile judicial review and democ-
racy.17 
 
13. For a few very recent proposals, see Jack Balkin, Don’t Pack the Court. Regularize Appointments, 
BALKINIZATION (Oct. 5, 2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/dont-pack-court 
-regularize-appointments.html [https://perma.cc/GEU9-JE5P]; Kent Greenfield, Create a 
New Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10 
/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html [https://perma.cc/BLK3-QDNN]; Seth Hill, A 
Fair and Legitimizing Reform of the Supreme Court, SETH HILL’S BLOG (Oct. 22, 2020), 
https://www.sethjhill.com/blog/2020/10/22/supreme-court-reform [https://perma.cc 
/6RUT-W8ZJ]; and Adam J. Levitin, Supersize the Supreme Court to Save It, AM. PROSPECT 
(Oct. 12, 2020), https://prospect.org/justice/supersize-the-supreme-court-to-save-it 
[https://perma.cc/4X4W-8FMT]. 
14. See, e.g., Matt Ford, A Better Way to Fix the Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC (June 4, 2019), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/154047/better-way-fix-supreme-court [https://perma.cc 
/2Z4S-T5PD]. 
15. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Why Pete Buttigieg Is Wrong About the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 
6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/opinion/buttigieg-warren-supreme-court 
.html [https://perma.cc/E8JW-YM9B]. 
16. See infra Parts I and II. 
17. For a history of these debates, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
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Today, there are almost as many constitutional theories as there are constitu-
tional scholars. And there are many different attitudes among theorists toward 
judicial review. Some seek to expand judicial review beyond its present do-
main,18 while others would abolish it entirely,19 with many other views lying in 
between those extremes. What unites most constitutional theories today, how-
ever, is at least some lip service to the primacy of democracy. While a few theo-
rists disclaim any particular interest in the will of the people, most try to anchor 
their theories in some account of how the Court’s role proceeds from American 
democracy. Put slightly differently, most scholars thinking about the role of the 
Court recognize that the Court’s role must ultimately be constrained by, and con-
sistent with, democracy—even if they differ wildly in their prescriptions for how 
to achieve that result. 
Two first-rate scholarly responses to our proposals illustrate this point. First, 
from the right, Stephen Sachs argues that we err by seeing the Supreme Court 
as powerful enough to do “just anything,” which makes it “too powerful a super-
weapon to leave lying around in a democracy.”20 From the left, Ryan Doerfler 
and Samuel Moyn argue that our proposals fail to recognize that American de-
mocracy is “beset by deep ills for which Supreme Court power is no part of a 
cure.”21 Both responses recognize the danger that the Supreme Court can have 
for a democracy, and both offer significant changes to existing practices that they 
claim would disempower the Court and thereby remove the threat it poses to 
democratic self-government. 
Yet the nature of their proposals is wildly different—from ours and from each 
other’s. Sachs argues that instead of restructuring the Court, the way to ensure 
the Court is legitimate and fulfills its appropriate role in democracy is for mem-
bers of the Court to adhere to a particular form of jurisprudence: “Limited gov-
ernment, federalism, originalism, and so on.”22 Doerfler and Moyn, by contrast, 
argue for reform, though a different kind than we proposed. In their view, rather 
 
18. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2013) (arguing for significant changes from current constitutional doctrine). For an 
account arguing that the Supreme Court should issue broad decisions, rather than narrow 
ones, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
19. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154-76 
(2000). 
20. Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A Response to Epps & Sitaraman, 129 YALE 
L.J. F. 93, 95 (2019). 
21. Ryan Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2021) (manuscript at 8). 
22. Sachs, supra note 20, at 107. 
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than trying to change the Court’s membership, progressives should pursue “dis-
empowering” reforms, such as jurisdiction-stripping and supermajority voting 
rules, that would limit or completely restrict the Court’s ability to interfere with 
democratically authorized legislation.23 
We share these critics’ desire to put the Supreme Court in its proper place, 
ultimately subservient to the democratic process. Where we part ways, however, 
is in our assessment of the best way to accomplish that goal. In this Essay, we 
explain why. Our starting point is James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 article The Origin 
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.24 We argue that we and 
our interlocutors can all be seen as descendants of Thayer in seeking a way to 
ensure that courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, do not improperly 
usurp democratic authority. We identify different strategies for achieving 
Thayerian goals and argue that our critics err by focusing too singlemindedly on 
their favored strategies to the detriment of more promising alternatives. 
Thayer argued that the appropriate role for federal courts was deference to 
the political branches, striking down federal statutes as unconstitutional only 
when the court determines that the legislature has clearly erred in its own con-
stitutional judgment.25 That is, his approach was to ask judges to understand 
their proper role and to exercise restraint. We call this classically Thayerian ap-
proach internal restraint because it focuses on how judges behave. Few modern 
constitutional theorists endorse Thayer’s clear-error rule. Nonetheless, we think 
that most leading interpretive methods fall into this broad category because they 
aim to ensure judicial restraint or because they claim to offer a methodology that 
provides clear rules for when courts should—and should not—strike down leg-
islation. As we explain in Part I, we see Sachs as one contemporary practitioner 
within this broader paradigm. We criticize his approach, and the internal-con-
straint approach more generally, as unlikely to succeed for a variety of practical 
reasons, such as indeterminacy and the lack of meaningful enforcement mecha-
nisms. 
Instead, we argue that neo-Thayerians—those who believe that federal 
courts should be restrained in a democracy—should instead focus on two other 
categories of deference-forcing strategies: external constraints and structural re-
forms. External constraints do not alter the Court’s structure but instead seek to 
cabin, prohibit, discipline, or narrow the Court’s exercise of the power of judicial 
review. Structural reforms, in contrast, seek to restrain the actions of the Court 
 
23. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 17, at 22-25. 
24. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 129 (1893). 
25. Id. at 144. 
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by changing its very design. Within these broad categories are many possibili-
ties, ranging from slight limits on Court power to more severe restrictions. 
Reams of paper have been spent on debates about internal restraint on the Court, 
but there has not been the same level of interest in external constraints and struc-
tural reforms. This is surprising because the Madisonian approach to the Con-
stitution sought to restrain power through external and design mechanisms, ra-
ther than assuming that officials would follow the correct theory of their own 
proper role.26 The Madisonian approach has its downsides, given that it rests on 
overly simplistic assumptions about the motivations of government actors, who 
are more likely to advance the interests of the political parties to which they be-
long rather than the interests of the branch of government that they inhabit.27 
But for those with neo-Thayerian instincts, it may prove more helpful going for-
ward than interminable and intractable debates on internal restraints. 
As we explain in Part II, Doerfler and Moyn’s proposals are examples of ex-
ternal constraints on the Court. Such reforms can, we think, play an important 
role in keeping the Court in its proper lane in a democracy. We argue, however, 
that Doerfler and Moyn create a false dichotomy between “disempowering” and 
“personnel” reforms—one that obscures the critical fact that there are both direct 
and indirect ways to disempower the Court. Personnel reforms can themselves 
be disempowering. More substantively, we note that their assessment of the ben-
efits of the reforms they favor—in particular, jurisdiction-stripping—is far too 
rosy. The practical details of how such a measure would work are essential to 
achieving their own goal of implementing progressive policies. But Doerfler and 
Moyn do not work out how progressive policies would be stable if their aggres-
sive proposals to disempower the Court were adopted. 
Instead, we argue in Part III that those who seek to restrain the Court should 
look hard at structural reforms. Such reforms are, in our view, in the best tradi-
tion of American constitutional design and are most likely to provide solutions 
to the problems that the Supreme Court currently faces with the least practical 
difficulties. Our proposals are examples of structural reforms, but they are far 
from the only ones. Some form of structural redesign must be central to the con-
versation about how to reform the Supreme Court—and, indeed, how to save it. 
 
26. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 665-72 (2011). 
27. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915 (2005) (arguing, contra Madison, that officials’ interests do not always align with 
the interests of their institutions, but rather arise from a variety of motivations); Daryl J. Lev-
inson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) 
(noting that Madison’s approach did not account for political parties). 
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i .  internal restraints 
We begin by considering the original Thayerian strategy for keeping courts 
in their proper role in a democracy: what we call internal restraints. And that 
means starting—of course—with Thayer himself. It is debatable how much 
Thayer deserves credit for the idea of judicial restraint.28 What’s unquestionable, 
though, is that he was the most influential academic proponent of the idea.29 
Thayer’s famous article offered three justifications for why courts should exercise 
extreme restraint in declaring federal laws unconstitutional. First, he believed 
that the coordinate branches of government were themselves charged with mak-
ing their own judgments as to the constitutionality of legislation.30 Second, he 
thought “the [C]onstitution often admits of different interpretations.”31 There 
is a “range of choice and judgment,” and “much which will seem unconstitutional 
to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another.”32 This 
inherent uncertainty cut in favor of deference to Congress. Finally, he worried 
that if the judiciary became the sole expositor of constitutionality, Congress’s ca-
pacity to deliberate on the constitutionality and wisdom of legislation would 
wither.33 For these reasons, he urged courts to overturn legislation only when 
“those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but 
have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”34 
Thayer’s ideas continue to influence legal scholarship more than a century 
after his article was published. But while his ideas may have once informed the 
practices of actual judges, his approach seems decidedly out of favor today in the 
judiciary. Supreme Court Justices appointed by both Republicans and Demo-
crats seem more than willing to declare federal statutes unconstitutional, even if 
 
28. See Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 621 
(2012). 
29. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 845 (1997) (“Thayer described and defended a 
practice of restraint for courts of constitutional review in a way that no scholar before him had 
done.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1983) (calling Thayer’s article “the most influential essay ever written on American constitu-
tional law”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1222 (1978) (calling Thayer “an important intellectual 
fount of the judicial restraint thesis”).  
30. See Thayer, supra note 24, at 135. 
31. Id. at 144. 
32. Id. 
33. See id. at 155-56. 
34. Id. at 144. 
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they do not agree about which statutes should be struck down.35 No Supreme 
Court Justice in recent decades could be plausibly described as one of Thayer’s 
disciples. 
Why has the Thayerian project failed? Richard Posner has argued that the 
traditional Thayerian approach collapsed with the rise of constitutional theory.36 
Constitutional scholars in the mid-to-late twentieth century increasingly offered 
interpretive methodologies—like originalism, textualism, and political-process 
theory—that claimed to provide an objectively correct answer to constitutional 
questions. This put Thayerian restraint under two attacks. It undermined 
Thayer altogether by denying the uncertainty inherent in many constitutional 
questions. But even if one accepted a Thayerian approach, constitutional theory 
expanded the category of “clear error,” thereby narrowing the window for defer-
ence. With the right method, there would be little that “admits of different in-
terpretations.” Either way, the Court would not need to defer as much to legisla-
tures. 
Yet from a different vantage point, most modern constitutional theories can 
also be seen as descendants of Thayer. That is because most theories purport to 
offer some account of why and when judicial review is ultimately consistent with 
democracy. John Hart Ely’s process theory, for example, contends that under 
some circumstances courts can reinforce democracy by striking down legisla-
tion.37 Leading conservative jurists and legal scholars contend that originalism 
ensures judicial restraint vis-à-vis the will of democracy.38 Justice Scalia, for ex-
ample, famously argued that “[o]riginalism is the only approach to text that is 
compatible with democracy.”39 
 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (declaring the Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional, over the dissent of four conservative Justices); Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (declaring provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Act unconstitutional, over the dissent of four liberal Justices). 
36. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519 (2012). 
There are, of course, other explanations. Most notably, the rise of polarization and motivated 
reasoning would lead to diametrically opposed approaches to interpretation that would make 
consensus more difficult. 
37. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
38. Though not all originalists. Steven Calabresi, for example, criticizes Justice Scalia for confus-
ing originalism and Thayerian judicial restraint, arguing that one cannot simultaneously be 
an originalist and Thayerian. For Calabresi, originalism is to be followed even if it does not 
restrain judges vis-à-vis the political branches. See Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism and James 
Bradley Thayer, 11 NW. U. L. REV. 1419 (2019). For a book-length treatment that makes the 
case that originalism is normatively desirable, see JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAP-
PAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013). 
39. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 82 
(2012). For more, see John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. 
L. REV. 747 (2017). 
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With these observations to set the stage, we now are prepared to consider 
Sachs’s response to How to Save the Supreme Court. Sachs offers a number of 
thoughtful responses to the details of our proposals, which we will not quibble 
with here. Instead, we will start with a point of common ground: Sachs fears an 
all-powerful Court that can be used as a partisan weapon, just as we do. As he 
puts it, “[a] Court that can do just anything is too powerful a superweapon to 
leave lying around in a democracy; sooner or later, someone is bound to pick it 
up.”40 In our view, it is precisely the Court’s ability to do so much that makes it 
ripe for partisan capture. 
Where we part ways with Sachs, however, is on how to solve the problem. 
He argues that if our goal is “to restore legitimacy, legal conservatives might have 
a few ideas to offer”41: 
Given the depth of our country’s polarization, maybe we should require 
less by way of social agreement, relying somewhat more on private or-
dering and reducing the number of questions that the political process 
needs to answer. Maybe we should reduce the scope of that process, en-
couraging working agreements by different parts of the country when 
consensus is lacking in the whole. And maybe, to reduce the threat of the 
Supreme-Court-as-superweapon—capable of vaporizing any target that 
shows up in the Justices’ gunsights—we should precommit to limiting 
the Court’s freedom of action, binding it to some discrete set of preexist-
ing rules until there is a very broad consensus for changing them. (We 
could even write those rules down on a piece of paper, to be kept in the 
National Archives—and change them only by agreement of, say, two-
thirds of each House of Congress, and some three-fourths or so of the 
states.)42 
Here, Sachs does not invoke Thayer, and he is certainly not endorsing any-
thing like Thayer’s clear-error rule as an interpretive guide for courts. Nonethe-
less, we think it fair to cast him among Thayer’s heirs. He, like Thayer, seeks to 
keep the Court in its proper role in our democracy. Specifically, he proposes to 
do so by relying on “[l]imited government, federalism, originalism, and so on.”43 
Originalism is an excellent example of what we have described as an internal 
restraint. That is, it requires judges to adopt a certain posture when interpreting 
the laws; faithful adherence to this interpretive methodology will (the theory 
 
40. Sachs, supra note 20, at 95. 
41. Id. at 106. 
42. Id. at 106-07. 
43. Id. at 107. 
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goes) ensure that the Court does not usurp power that should belong to the peo-
ple themselves. 
While we admire Sachs’s scholarship on originalism, we think that his re-
sponse to Supreme Court reform ultimately reveals why the internal-restraints 
approach is unlikely to succeed—indeed, why we think it is doomed to failure. 
Consider the specifics of Sachs’s proposed solution. He says the key to disarming 
the Court is to ensure that it follows a “discrete set of preexisting rules” written 
down on “a piece of paper . . . kept in the National Archives.”44 That is, the key 
is for the Court to simply follow and strictly enforce the constitutional text (and, 
presumably, its original meaning). Some version of this command has been the 
marketing slogan for textualists and originalists for quite some time. Consider, 
for example, then-Judge Barrett’s opening statement at her Supreme Court con-
firmation hearing, in which she explained that she learned from (self-described 
originalist) Justice Scalia that “[a] judge must apply the law as written, not as 
the judge wishes it were.”45 
As a strategy for ensuring democratic restraint, these theories suffer from 
many objections that have long been discussed among constitutional scholars. 
First of all, even an approach that could consistently and correctly identify the 
objective meaning of every constitutional provision would be subject to the crit-
icism that it is undemocratic to allow choices by long-dead framers and ratifiers 
to overturn the will of present-day majorities.46 But even if one can find some 
theory to resolve this dead-hand problem, the other difficulty is that neither the 
text nor the original meaning of the Constitution—the document stored at the 
National Archives—uncontroversially resolve the disputes that most divide our 
polity and that the Supreme Court has taken upon itself to decide. 
The legal conservative movement uses the slogan “apply[ing] the law as 
written” to justify overturning cases like Roe v. Wade47 and its progeny. But Jus-
tices part of that same movement have brought us no shortage of decisions like 
Shelby County v. Holder, in which the Court’s conservative majority overturned 
 
44. Id. 
45. Read: Amy Coney Barrett’s Opening Statement Ahead of the Supreme Court Hearings, POLITICO 
(Oct. 11, 2020, 11:28 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/11/amy-coney 
-barrett-opening-statement-supreme-court-428635 [https://perma.cc/PUD6-DM9Z]. 
46. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CALIF. L. REV. 381 (1997) (raising dead-
hand arguments against fidelity to the views of past generations); Adam M. Samaha, Dead 
Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008) (offering an 
analysis of dead-hand justifications). 
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the preclearance formula in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act based on an atex-
tual “principle of equal sovereignty.”48 And Shelby County is only one example of 
a case in which conservative Justices aggressively interfered with democracy 
based on less-than-clear constitutional text and history. Such cases have struck 
down democratically enacted legislation concerning voting rights,49 campaign-
finance reform,50 affirmative action,51 and gun control,52 among other examples. 
In these cases, neither constitutional text nor history unambiguously compelled 
the result that the Court reached. 
One possible response, of course, is that the Supreme Court and even some 
scholarly commentators have failed to be sufficiently faithful to text and original 
meaning. That is, perhaps the correct approach to constitutional interpretation 
would lead to more restraint. But that is part of the problem. Even limited to 
using the tools of textualism and originalism, American lawyers and judges can 
develop arguments for many outcomes that have at least a veneer of legal plau-
sibility.53 And, as we see over and over, Justices’ views about the plausibility of 
those arguments seems closely correlated with their ideological attitudes toward 
the political and policy consequences of any particular decision. Moreover, as 
theorists spend time working out the details of interpretive theories like original-
ism, the theories themselves end up getting foggier—offering a less-sharp edge 
with which to slice legal problems. As Jeremy Kessler and David Pozen have ar-
gued, prescriptive legal theories have a tendency to “work themselves impure” 
 
48. 570 U.S. 529, 542 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 
(2009)). 
49. See, e.g., id. For a thorough argument that Shelby County does not rest on a solid historical or 
doctrinal foundation, see Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207 
(2016). 
50. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010) (striking down a 
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act restricting corporations from making in-
dependent expenditures for certain campaign-related speech).  
51. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470-72 (1989) (holding that the 
Minority Business Utilization Plan adopted by the Richmond City Council violated the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
52. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms). For an argument that Heller was not 
“originalist” but instead a case study in how a modern social movement can advance its pref-
erences, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192-94 (2008). 
53. See FRANK CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 189 (2013) (“[R]eliance on originalist 
sources is not . . . particularly constraining, so justices exercise their ideological preferences in 
cases using originalism as much as in other decisions.”). 
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as they mature, acquire more adherents, and confront and respond to criticisms 
and flaws.54 
These problems are not unique to constitutional law. Take an example from 
statutory interpretation, where textualism is increasingly the dominant ap-
proach. On its face, textualism offers very limited resources to determine the 
meaning of statutes, so it might seem to offer an even greater likelihood of de-
termining unambiguously “correct” answers to legal questions. And yet, in 
prominent Supreme Court cases, such as Bostock v. Clayton County,55 dueling 
opinions come to opposite conclusions—while both simultaneously claiming the 
banner of textualism. Tara Grove thus observes that the question in Bostock is 
really “which textualism” will apply.56 
Even if legal elites could agree on a single interpretive modality (which they 
obviously cannot, even after many decades of debate and reams of writing on 
interpretation), within any particular methodology, there are innumerable vari-
ants or flavors. Not all textualists are originalists, and vice versa. And Sachs’s 
originalism is not Stephen Calabresi’s or Larry Solum’s or Jack Balkin’s or Akhil 
Amar’s—or for that matter, Hugo Black’s.57 
It gets worse. Because even if the legal profession agreed to adopt a single 
strain of a single interpretive methodology, interpreters are consistently incon-
sistent. Judges who claim to adhere to a certain methodology frequently fail to 
do so. Internal restraints, it turns out, are not very constraining. Justice Scalia 
himself famously admitted that he was a “faint-hearted” originalist precisely be-
cause he was not always willing to decide cases in the manner that originalism 
required.58 
This, of course, raises the bigger question of whether politicians or judges 
much care about the theories themselves. Think about it this way, would Repub-
licans enthusiastically support Jack Balkin for a position on the Supreme Court 
because he is an originalist? We doubt it. The reason, of course, is that Balkin is 
a liberal originalist, not a conservative one. Theories like originalism or textual-
ism are much bandied about, but political actors seem, quite simply, to prefer 
those who support their policy preferences. 
 
54. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of 
Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2016). 
55. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
56. Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 290 (2020) (emphasis added). 
57. Cf. James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10, 11-12 (2007) (noting 
the many different people who ascribe to originalism, with extremely different views on the 
outcomes of constitutional questions). 
58. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). For a criticism, 
see Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 7 (2006). 
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Returning to the Supreme Court, there is another problem, one that we think 
Sachs does not take seriously enough. Does a commitment to the variant of 
“[l]imited government, federalism, originalism, and so on” that Sachs endorses 
require the left to simply live with decisions striking down democratically en-
acted legislation abhorred by conservatives? Such decisions deprive political ac-
tors of the ability to resolve difficult and sensitive matters in the name of con-
servative legal values, and many do so in a way that advances the electoral and 
policy interests of conservatives and the Republican Party. If Sachs’s proposed 
solution would require accepting decisions like this, his approach would entail 
not mutual disarmament but rather unilateral surrender by progressives as the 
Court advances conservative policy preferences under an originalist banner. 
Indeed, Sachs himself mentions “[l]imited government, federalism, [and] 
originalism,” in a manner common to the conservative political and ideological 
project, but without grappling with the fierce conflict between these ideas. What 
of the tension between originalism and the transformative impact on American 
federalism that occurred with the Reconstruction Amendments?59 What of the 
conflict between originalism and the history of the expansive powers of the fed-
eral government?60 Indeed, we might even think of the political project of 
“[l]imited government, federalism, [and] originalism” as itself a type of Su-
preme Court reform—and one that has been particularly successful, given the 
multigenerational effort by Republican politicians as well as organizations like 
the Federalist Society to reshape the judiciary. Few should be surprised if pro-
gressives thus decline to go along. 
And while Sachs dismisses our reform proposals as “radical,” we think that 
label is quite apt for the solution he proposes.61 However radical our interpreta-
tion of, say, the phrase “one Supreme Court” in Article III, that seems to us trivial 
when compared with the radical changes to American law and American life that 
would be required if our country (as it may, without Supreme Court reform) 
goes all-in on the approach Sachs urges. 
 
59. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
1459, 1461-63 (2012); Kermit Roosevelt III, Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 TEX. L. REV. 121, 
141-42 (2012). 
60. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15-29 (2010) (discussing the expan-
sive original meaning of “commerce”); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1045, 1055-57 (2014) (discussing the expansive powers of Congress under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clauses). 
61. Sachs, supra note 20, at 95. 
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Such a commitment might well lead the Court to invalidate the Affordable 
Care Act.62 It could lead the Court to declare all federal administrative agencies 
unconstitutional.63 It might even require the Court to hold that paper money is 
unconstitutional.64 Sachs asks us to consider the compromises that those who 
drafted and amended the Constitution made, as they “lived through civil war, 
economic crisis, and profound moral disagreement (over human slavery, among 
other topics).”65 Yet originalism seems to demand that we pay no heed to other 
judgments and compromises by our political predecessors that were no less im-
portant.66 
Ultimately, though, our problem is not with any particular variety of inter-
pretive theory. It is with the idea that the complete solution to the problem of a 
Supreme Court in a democracy—an institution that has grown too powerful, and 
that is resolving too many questions that should be left to political actors—lies 
in any kind of internal restraints imposed by judges themselves. Whether that 
restraint is classical Thayerianism, originalism, textualism, political-process the-
ory, or some other interpretive methodology, history and common sense give us 
no reason to believe that relying on judges to police themselves will provide the 
proper checks. Moreover, in an age of extreme polarization, motivated reason-
ing, and biased perceptions and interpretation, it is hard for us to see how leav-
ing restraint to judges alone will result in more than the rhetoric of restraint 
masking the reality of rivalry. 
 
62. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, The PPACA in Wonderland, 38 AM. J. LAW & MED. 
269, 270 (2012) (“According to the original meaning of the Constitution, Congress acted with-
out legal authority when it enacted the individual mandate.”); see also Stephen E. Sachs, The 
Uneasy Case for the Affordable Care Act, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 24-25 (2012) (suggest-
ing, without definitively endorsing, arguments for why the Affordable Care Act might exceed 
Congress’s powers). 
63. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1232-33 (1994). 
64. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1, 13 (2016) (“It is highly unlikely . . . that any originalist justice is eager to provoke 
crisis by declaring that paper money is unconstitutional; yet both originalists and their critics 
have assumed that fidelity to the original meaning would require a justice to do just that.”). 
65. Sachs, supra note 20, at 107. 
66. In one particularly troubling example, originalist-identifying Justices were part of the major-
ity in Shelby County, in which the Court rejected the compromises that led to the Voting Rights 
Act, a statute that many Black Americans fought for and—quite literally—died for. See gener-
ally Litman, supra note 49 (arguing that the Court relied on an invented historical principle of 
equal sovereignty to strike part of the Voting Rights Act). 
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Perhaps we are wrong. Perhaps American judges can show the kind of heroic 
self-restraint that is worthy of epic poetry. But perhaps not. After all, even Ulys-
ses needed to be tied to the mast.67 The difficulties for the mortal judge are, as 
we have noted, that there are fewer clear answers to legal questions than one 
might hope, that scholars and judges cannot agree on a single interpretive the-
ory, that even working within one interpretive theory, there are often plausible 
arguments for both sides of important legal questions, and that adherents to in-
terpretive methodologies are unreliable in their faithfulness to those theories. 
These are difficult challenges for mere mortals to overcome. 
More generally, we find fanciful the idea that the best way to curb a too-
powerful institution is by developing a better theory of how actors within that 
institution should behave. Ultimately, every theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion that claims to successfully rein in judges fails to account for the many and 
various imperfections of humans. To paraphrase then-Judge Barrett, we should 
take people as they are, not as we wish them to be.68 
Indeed, if we want to consider the wisdom of the Founders, as Sachs asks us 
to, one thing we might do is observe how they chose to deal with the problem of 
power. After overthrowing the rule of a monarchy through a violent revolution, 
they designed a new government that they hoped would be less oppressive than 
the one they had renounced. Their solution was not simply to adopt a new mon-
archy, supplemented with a new, improved theory of how a just monarch should 
behave. Instead, they created structures and institutions that would distribute 
and cabin power.69 Though the Founders’ specific choices are open to question,70 
this approach to constitutional design generally is, we think, the right way to 
think about Supreme Court reform in particular. And in the next two Parts, we 
discuss what we see as better solutions to the problem of restraining the power 
of the Supreme Court in a democracy. 
i i .  external constraints 
If internal restraints on judges are likely to prove unavailing, what other op-
tions are available for those seeking to rein in the Supreme Court? The alterna-
tives, as we see it, are strategies that either impose constraints on the Court or 
that reconfigure the institution of the Supreme Court itself. We call these ap-
proaches external constraints and structural reform, respectively. In this Part, we 
will discuss the first option, external constraints. This method takes for granted 
 
67. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000). 
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
70. See infra note 81. 
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the basic structure of the Supreme Court as an institution, but imposes some 
restrictions limiting its power or constraining its decisionmaking. 
In framing the category of external constraints on the Court, we disagree 
with Doerfler and Moyn’s taxonomy of possible Court reforms. They identify 
two opposing categories of reform. The first is “personnel reforms”; that is, pro-
posals “to alter the Supreme Court’s partisan or ideological composition,” a cat-
egory that includes Court expansion, term limits, partisan-balance require-
ments, and both of our own proposals.71 Their second category, “disempowering 
reforms,” are reforms which “take aim at what the Supreme Court is permitted 
to do.”72 This second category, which Doerfler and Moyn favor, includes juris-
diction-stripping, supermajority-voting requirements, and legislative overrides. 
We value Doerfler and Moyn’s contribution to this debate, and in particular 
we think they bring into focus important questions about how progressives 
should think about courts. Their taxonomy, however, does not persuade us, be-
cause the two categories they identify are not mutually exclusive. The opposite 
of disempowering reforms is empowering reforms, not personnel reforms; per-
sonnel reforms can themselves be disempowering. Their taxonomy is like saying 
“there are two kinds of cars: electric ones and red ones.” 
Nor is it obvious how some reforms even map onto their taxonomy. Would 
a reform that replaced life tenure for the Justices with at-will service at the pleas-
ure of the President be a “personnel” reform, or a “disempowering” one? Doer-
fler and Moyn do not say; such a reform would have major consequences for 
both the Court’s composition and for its power (as it would be the effective end 
of judicial independence). The fundamental problem is that Doerfler and Moyn 
take a formalistic approach to disempowering reforms—looking only to actions 
that directly constrain the Court as currently constituted. But there are many in-
direct ways to constrain the Court as well. If the goal is to understand the ways 
to ensure a restrained Court in a democracy, we think our taxonomy better or-
ganizes the options than their approach. 
In this Part, we examine external constraints more closely. We have two 
goals. First, we attempt to catalogue the various types of Supreme Court reforms 
that can be characterized as external constraints—that is, reforms that do not 
change the basic structure of the Court itself, but rather limit its ability to inter-
fere with democracy by imposing some external limit on the Court’s decision 
making or power. Second, we offer some thoughts on when and why external 
constraints might be appropriate, and what their drawbacks are, with particular 
attention to the reforms favored by Doerfler and Moyn. 
 
71. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 21 (manuscript at 17-18). 
72. Id. (manuscript at 18). 
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Let us start with what Doerfler and Moyn categorize as disempowering re-
forms: jurisdiction-stripping, legislatively mandated supermajority-voting 
rules, and legislative overrides. We think all are best understood as external con-
straints—that is, limitations or checks placed on judicial behavior. For each re-
form, the current structure of the Court itself remains unaffected, but its ability 
to render certain kinds of decisions is limited. With jurisdiction-stripping, the 
Court (as well as possibly other federal and state courts) is denied the ability to 
hear certain classes of cases, such as those involving “affirmative action or gun 
control.”73 
Supermajority-voting rules (versions of which we included in our proposed 
reforms) would require the Court to have a specified supermajority in order to 
accomplish certain outcomes—such as declaring a federal statute unconstitu-
tional. Doerfler and Moyn argue that such a rule “would effectively implement a 
Thayerian ‘clear error’ standard for judicial review.”74 Unlike jurisdiction-strip-
ping, which cuts the Court out of the picture entirely, this reform would “pre-
serve but severely constrain the Supreme Court’s ability to intervene in federal 
policymaking.”75 
Finally, Doerfler and Moyn briefly discuss legislative overrides, such as a rule 
“letting Congress override the Supreme Court’s judgment that federal legislation 
is unconstitutional with a majority or supermajority vote.”76 We also think leg-
islative overrides are a particularly useful form of external constraint, and that 
they deserve greater discussion. Examples of such external constraints can be 
found in other countries. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for 
example, has had a provision since 1982 that enables Parliament to override a 
constitutional decision by the high court that overturns a statute.77 The “not-
withstanding” clause allows the re-enacted statute to operate in spite of the 
’court’s decision. Mark Tushnet has called this arrangement “weak form judicial 
review,” because it preserves a role for the judiciary in reviewing statutes for con-
stitutionality, but does not necessarily let the judiciary have the last word.78 
Under current arrangements, Congress has no power to override constitu-
tional decisions. But it has the power to override statutory decisions, and it has 
 
73. Id. (manuscript at 31). 
74. Id. (manuscript at 24). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. (footnote omitted). 
77. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 33 (U.K.). 
78. Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205, 212 (2008). 
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often used that power to express disapproval of the Supreme Court’s work.79 It 
did so, for example, when Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, which overturned Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,80 a decision that 
imposed strict time limits for filing employment-discrimination claims. The 
power to override statutory decisions is exercised on an occasional, ad hoc basis, 
and in recent years has been in decline.81 But one of us has proposed a mecha-
nism for regularizing that power: a Congressional Review Act for the Court.82 
Under the existing Congressional Review Act,83 Congress may review a regula-
tion promulgated by a federal agency and overturn it through a fast-tracked bi-
cameralism and presentment process. Because regulations are issued pursuant to 
statutory authority, Congress and the President are well within their powers to 
make such a revision to agency action. Using that act as a model, Congress could 
pass a Congressional Review Act to overturn statutory interpretation decisions 
from the Supreme Court. The CRA for the Court would create a similar fast-
track process requiring Congress to vote on whether to overturn the Court’s stat-
utory decisions.84 
In addition to the reforms that Doerfler and Moyn highlight, many other 
provisions or potential reforms are properly understood as external constraints. 
Consider removals from office. The Constitution unquestionably permits Con-
gress to impeach, try, convict, and remove a Supreme Court Justice from office.85 
But it may be permissible to remove judges more easily. Saikrishna Prakash and 
Steven Smith have argued that “good-behavior tenure” under Article III does not 
mean that impeachment is the only mechanism for removal.86 They argue that 
this provision is far broader than commentators have recognized and allows for 
 
79. See generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014) (offer-
ing data on overrides over time); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (same). 
80. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
81. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 79 (offering data and making this point); see also 
Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 
86 S. CALIF. L. REV. 205, 208-09 (2013) (same). 
82. Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Rein in an All-Too-Powerful Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/congressional-review-act-court 
/601924 [https://perma.cc/P5WE-PPRU]. 
83. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2018). 
84. Sitaraman, supra note 82. 
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 -3. 
86. Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 78 
(2006). 
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removal based on a judicial finding of misconduct.87 Even more broadly, we 
could imagine a constitutional system in which Supreme Court Justices were re-
movable without cause through a simple majority vote in Congress,88 or in 
which they served at the pleasure of the President, as in the hypothetical dis-
cussed above. 
In all cases, removal powers are an external threat to continuation in office, 
and will have some disciplining effect on the behavior of Justices. The extent to 
which they rein in the Justices will, of course, be linked to the difficulty of the 
removal process and the criteria for removal, both of which speak to the likeli-
hood the threat will be carried out. Under current law, the high threshold for 
removal in Senate impeachment trials makes removal an idle threat. Nonethe-
less, it is much easier to impeach a Justice than remove them from office, as only 
a majority vote in the House of Representatives is necessary for the former. And, 
it is possible the impeachment power could be used to rein in the Supreme Court 
even if actual removal remains unlikely. The process of being impeached may be 
unpleasant and stigmatizing enough, regardless of the outcome. Those who call 
for Congress to impeach Justice Kavanaugh may have this goal in mind, given 
how hard it is to imagine two-thirds of the Senate ever supporting his removal.89 
Consider also a reform that is the flipside of jurisdiction-stripping: docket 
filling. Today, the Court enjoys almost total discretion over its caseload; it has a 
small number of cases per year arising under mandatory appellate and original 
jurisdiction, but otherwise it has total discretion to choose cases from among the 
many thousands of certiorari petitions filed each year.90 It was not always thus; 
the Court for much of its history had mandatory appellate jurisdiction over a 
broader swath of cases.91 One could imagine restoring more of the Court’s man-
 
87. Id. at 98, 132-33. In some ways, their claim is parallel to those made by scholars who note that 
congressionally-specified removal criteria for agency heads (inefficiency, neglect of duty, and 
malfeasance) are also readily assessed and could be used more frequently against them. See 
Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory 
Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 66-71 (2021). 
88. Some early state constitutions operated in this fashion, with judges subject to “removal by 
address,” a process that involved only a majority of the legislature to remove the judge. JED 
HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
AMERICA 20 (2012). 
89. See, e.g., Scott Lemieux, Opinion, Brett Kavanaugh’s Impeachment Won’t Happen. But Calling 
for It Is Still Useful, NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion 
/brett-kavanaugh-s-impeachment-won-t-happen-calling-it-still-ncna1055546 [https:// 
perma.cc/C84Y-F2VS]. 
90. For a discussion of the problems with this approach, see Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The 
Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 717 (2018). 
91. Id. at 705. 
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datory appellate jurisdiction. A Court that had to decide, say, more routine crim-
inal appeals every year might have less time and energy to devote to grand con-
stitutional rulings that intrude on the prerogatives of the other branches. Per-
haps the mere threat of such a reform might cause the Justices to dodge 
particularly controversial issues by denying review or even voting differently in 
cases before the Court. Another similar possibility is restricting the Court’s abil-
ity to choose its own cases, thus limiting its agenda-setting power and accord-
ingly its ability to shape the law.92 
A somewhat related proposal is Stephen Calabresi and David Presser’s argu-
ment for reintroducing circuit riding for Justices.93 They argue that the Justices 
should be required to spend four weeks each summer hearing trials in the circuits 
for which they serve as circuit justices. Far from an innovation, this proposal 
would essentially restore a practice from the very early days of the Republic, 
when riding circuit was an important part of each Justice’s duties. This proposal 
would, they argue, prevent the Justices from spending their summers in Europe 
(a source, in the authors’ eyes, of pernicious influence on their jurisprudence) 
while also providing greater motivation for elderly justices to retire.94 
Ethics rules are another external constraint that deserve greater attention. 
Currently, Supreme Court Justices are not subject to the judicial code of conduct, 
nor other common-sense rules on conflicts of interest (e.g., prohibitions against 
trading individual stocks or taking paid trips).95 Justices also routinely omit 
items from their financial disclosures without penalty.96 More stringent ethics 
requirements might constrain Justices from hearing certain cases by creating 
 
92. Melody Wang, Opinion, Don’t Let the Court Choose Its Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SN9-EM3S]. 
93. See Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1386 (2006). 
94. Id. at 1387-88, 1390. 
95. See, e.g., KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10255, A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE SU-
PREME COURT? LEGAL QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2008); Restoring Trust in an Impar-
tial and Ethical Judiciary, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/restore 
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96. Code of Ethics, FIX CT., https://fixthecourt.com/fix/code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/D6DK 
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clear recusal standards (such as in cases where there is potential for public skep-
ticism of a Justice’s objectivity97) or from being corrupted by soft forms of influ-
ence such as being feted by outside organizations.98 
Disclosure and transparency requirements might be another way to con-
strain the Court. Currently, no rules govern what the Justices must make public 
about their internal decisionmaking. Each Justice decides for themselves what 
papers to make public after retirement, and when. Justice Souter, for example, 
will not make his own papers public until fifty years after his death.99 Rules man-
dating quicker disclosure could enable the public to better understand how the 
Court makes decisions. And, to the extent that the Court’s tight secrecy enables 
it to maintain its aura of mystery, and thereby its prestige, mandatory disclosure 
rules might serve as a small but nontrivial check on the Court’s power.100 
Other measures also fall into this category. Some have proposed mandating 
that the Supreme Court publicly broadcast oral arguments via television.101 This 
might have a restraining effect on the Justices’ behaviors; they might be more 
fearful of majority opinion if publicity increased awareness of the Court gener-
ally. Or it could have a more activist effect, by causing Justices to play to partisan 
bases if publicity mainly caused the most ideologically extreme portions of the 
 
97. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Barrett Declines to Commit to Recusing Herself from a Trump Election 
Case, CNN (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/09/politics/barrett-recuse 
-presidential-election/index.html [https://perma.cc/KE9H-HZSG]. One of the authors 
(Epps) previously served as a Special Counsel on the Judiciary Committee staff of Senator 
Sheldon Whitehouse, who argued that Justice Barrett had an obligation to recuse herself in 
election-related cases brought by President Trump, given statements by the President and the 
proximity of her confirmation to the election. See Sheldon Whitehouse, Opinion, A Justice 
Barrett Must Recuse Herself from Deciding The Future of the President Who Picked Her, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/11/justice 
-barrett-must-recuse-herself-deciding-future-president-who-picked-her [https://perma.cc 
/6UBW-MTVY]. 
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https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019_08_SCOTUS 
%20Ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD6J-DVF5] (“[M]any of the justices have been criticized 
for accepting expensive memberships and memorabilia, donations to causes they support, and 
lavish international trips.”). 
99. Tony Mauro, Souter Blocks Access to His Papers for 50 Years, BLT: BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 26, 
2009, 4:06 PM), https://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/08/souter-blocks-access-to-his 
-papers-for-50-years.html [https://perma.cc/GJA6-V7E8]. 
100. Cf. Book Review, Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 709, 712 (1984) (“Stripped of the mystique that has led the public to view the 
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public to understand the Court’s work. But in either case, it is a legislative re-
striction placed on the Justices’ ability to control how the Court is perceived (as 
would be the opposite, legislation barring public broadcast of oral arguments). 
Suzanna Sherry has argued for mandating that the Court issue only unsigned 
opinions.102 She contends that the emergence of celebrity Justices is partly a 
function of signed opinions, in which Justices can show their styles and play to 
polarized publics. Omitting signatures might lead to greater restraint.103 
Other possibilities include Congress’s ability to control the Supreme Court’s 
budget. Though Justices’ salaries cannot be reduced under the Constitution,104 
Congress otherwise has plenary control over all other appropriations related to 
the Court. Congress could, for example, decline to provide funds for some of the 
Justices’ law clerks or other staff. Or it could make the Court vacate the “Marble 
Palace” at One First Street. Indeed, some scholars have argued that Congress’s 
decision to build a separate Supreme Court building in the 1930s—rather than 
have the Court remain in the basement of the Capitol—pushed the Court toward 
judicial supremacy.105 Whether this is true as a historical matter or not, the mere 
threat of losing their stately quarters might deter the Court from going too far 
in challenging Congress. 
There is thus a wide variety of external constraints, and a wide range in how 
constraining they are. At one extreme is jurisdiction-stripping, which completely 
deprives the Court of the ability to decide certain kinds of cases. At the other are 
gentler constraints, like Sherry’s requirement of unsigned opinions, which might 
effect more marginal change. Many other reforms likely fit into this category of 
external constraints. While we cannot enumerate all the possibilities here, defin-
ing the category can help guide further discussions on reforms. 
Having done so, we will also briefly offer some thoughts about the promise, 
and limitations, of external constraints. Doerfler and Moyn argue that “[a]sking 
‘how to save the Supreme Court’ is asking the wrong question. For saving it is 
not a desirable goal; getting it out of the way of progressive reform is.”106 That 
is, the threat they think progressives should be most concerned about is not that 
the Court will decline to exercise judicial review, and thus fail to protect certain 
rights; it is that the Court will inappropriately use the power of judicial review 
 
102. Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It), 106 IOWA L. REV. 181, 197-99 
(2020). 
103. Id. at 197. 
104. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. 
105. Robert Post, The Incomparable Chief Justiceship of William Howard Taft, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1, 179-87. On the general relationship between the Supreme Court’s building and iconography 
and its role in society, see Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Inventing Democratic Courts: A New 
and Iconic Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 207 (2013). 
106. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 21, at 6. 
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to block progressive legislation. This is a legitimate concern, and Doerfler and 
Moyn are right to emphasize it. This is especially so given liberals’ tendency to 
valorize the Court as a countermajoritarian defender of minority rights.107  
Nonetheless, we worry that the concern that Doerfler and Moyn identify 
does not obviously justify their conclusions about which kinds of reforms are 
most appropriate. Suppose that in the future Democrats were to conclude that 
the biggest threat from the Court was the danger that it would strike down 
healthcare reforms (such as Medicare for All) and climate-change legislation 
(such as the Green New Deal). Doerfler and Moyn would thus recommend what 
they call “disempowering” reforms, such as jurisdiction-stripping, to prevent the 
danger that the Court would declare these reforms unconstitutional.108 
But there are some significant practical problems with that strategy. Cer-
tainly, pairing a Medicare for All reform with a jurisdiction-stripping statute pre-
venting the Supreme Court from ruling on constitutional challenges to the law 
might seem sensible on its face. But how would this play out in practice? First 
and foremost, a jurisdiction-stripping provision barring only the Supreme Court 
from hearing a case would be ineffective because it would leave decisions in the 
hands of the federal courts of appeals. Such a provision would not solve the 
problem Doerfler and Moyn identify; it would merely push it downward from 
the high court to the lower courts. 
The alternative is to bar all federal courts from hearing constitutional cases. 
But this too has problems. As we already know from legal cases involving the 
Affordable Care Act, federal healthcare reforms are complex creatures with many 
moving parts. After the ACA survived its first major constitutional test in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,109 it faced a major statutory 
challenge in King v. Burwell,110 where the Court was asked to address the legality 
of the federal government’s practice (allegedly contrary to the statutory text) of 
 
107. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1996) (“It is common wisdom that a fundamental purpose of judicial review is 
to protect minority rights from majoritarian over-reaching. . . . This understanding of judicial 
review . . . exercises a powerful hold over our constitutional discourse”). 
108. Chris Sprigman makes similar claims about the progressive possibilities of jurisdiction-strip-
ping, including for policies such as a wealth tax and climate-change legislation. See Christo-
pher Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and the Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1778, 1841-43 (2020); Christopher Sprigman, With RBG’s Passing, Start Thinking About 
How to Rein in the Supreme Court, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.justsecurity 
.org/72512/with-rbgs-passing-start-thinking-about-how-to-rein-in-the-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/Q9FM-4R9X]. While we cannot here attend to every possible policy—and 
do acknowledge there are differences between policies—we believe our criticisms are widely 
applicable. 
109. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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providing subsidies to individuals who bought health insurance on federal ex-
changes in states that had not set up state health insurance exchanges. The Court 
agreed with the government’s reading of the statute as permitting the subsidies, 
but the case could easily have come out the other way—a result that would have 
led to major disruptions, perhaps causing millions to lose health insurance and 
severely undermining Congress’s goals in the ACA.111 
Any major, complex piece of federal legislation will likely face its own chal-
lenges like King, in which the Court could interpret the statute in some textually 
plausible way that could cripple or undermine the reform. And a Court that has 
been deprived of jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to a reform 
might be less inclined to interpret a statute as charitably as the King Court read 
the ACA. If the Court has fundamentally different values from those of the Con-
gress enacting the law, eliminating jurisdiction over constitutional challenges 
does not eliminate the threat. 
Perhaps, then, the response of jurisdiction-stripping proponents might be: 
the solution is not merely to strip all of the federal courts of jurisdiction over 
constitutional challenges to the healthcare reform; it is to strip them of jurisdic-
tion over all cases involving healthcare reform, constitutional or otherwise. Do-
erfler and Moyn propose such a solution when they discuss jurisdiction-strip-
ping statutes that also “channel jurisdiction to exclusive executive branch 
adjudication.”112 Here, too, there are problems. Reforms like the Affordable Care 
Act and Medicare for All are not one-time government actions but instead long-
term commitments by government to make certain services or resources availa-
ble. And to function effectively, those commitments need to be durable. 
But how, exactly, will any such reform be durable if entitlement holders can-
not enforce their entitlements? Would the Affordable Care Act have meaningfully 
survived the Trump Administration if its guarantees were protected exclusively 
by some form of “adjudication” conducted by the Trump Administration itself? 
We are skeptical. Our legal system relies heavily on courts to make government 
promises binding over time, especially given the tendency of the Executive 
Branch to flip-flop between Democratic and Republican control. A jurisdiction-
stripping approach needs to have a worked-out theory of how long-term com-
mitments are possible if courts are taken out of the picture entirely.113 
 
111. For a discussion of the statutory ambiguity in King, see Bradley Silverman, Statutory Ambiguity 
in King v. Burwell: Time for a Categorical Chevron Rule, 125 YALE L.J. F. 44 (2015). 
112. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 21, at 23. 
113. Sprigman has in a recent article and blog post outlined how jurisdiction-stripping might work 
in the context of a wealth tax and climate-change legislation delegating authority to the EPA 
to regulate emissions. See supra note 108. We admire his efforts to work through these exam-
ples in more detail, but believe they do not fully answer the challenge we have outlined here. 
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This point concerns jurisdiction-stripping, but it can be generalized to at 
least some other external constraints as well. External constraints can deter the 
Court from overstepping too far, but they cannot necessarily make the Court act 
as an effective partner in governance if it does not wish to play ball. And even if 
one shares Doerfler and Moyn’s view that courts impeding progressive legislative 
reform is a greater danger than courts refusing to interfere with legislation, there 
still will be situations in which the Supreme Court’s ability to enforce commit-
ments is needed to make reform stable. External constraints such as jurisdiction-
stripping alone cannot do that. Instead, to build the Court that we need, we must 
use the tools of structural reform—a topic to which the next Part turns. 
i i i .  structural reforms 
Internal restraints and external constraints both seek to limit the Court’s 
power in some way, and thus ensure that the Court does not overstep its bounds 
in a democracy. Structural reforms are different; they seek to redesign the Court 
itself so that it is more likely to produce decisions that are in line with—or, at 
least, not too out of line with—democracy. 
The insight is fundamentally Madisonian, in that Madison’s method of 
structural checks and balances in the original Constitution was intended to re-
strain the federal government without relying on a Bill of Rights that he and 
others thought would be little more than “parchment barriers.”114 In recent 
years, there has been significant scholarly commentary on the problems with the 
details of Madison’s approach—most notably, its failure to consider economic 
power and political parties.115 But the Madisonian insight nonetheless remains 
 
Regarding climate legislation, it is easy to imagine an administration refusing to regulate un-
der such authorities—but with jurisdiction-stripping, environmental groups would not be 
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standing to sue to enforce the tax, so perhaps that example fares better. In these cases, perhaps 
the benefits of jurisdiction-stripping outweigh the downsides for progressives because they 
are primarily regulatory and jurisdiction-stripping would insulate the policies from constitu-
tional challenge, even though enforcement may diverge administration to administration. But 
we think that ongoing commitments like health care are different; progressives should want 
individuals’ entitlements to remain stable even when administrations change. 
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a powerful one: the design of institutions will invariably shape their scope and 
exercise of power. 
This is another place where we object to Doerfler and Moyn’s framework. By 
juxtaposing personnel reforms with disempowering reforms, Doerfler and 
Moyn fail to recognize that “personnel” reforms (as well as other structural re-
forms) can be empowering or disempowering, depending on their details.116 In 
our earlier Feature, we proposed significant structural reforms to the Court, 
paired with some external constraints. The particular combination of reforms we 
chose was designed to accomplish the goals we laid out. We hoped to put “a 
thumb on the scale in the direction of deference” while also noting that “some 
role for judicial review is important, so that the Court can hold the nation to its 
deepest commitments and check its worst injustices.”117 
Our two proposals sought to operationalize those goals in distinct ways. The 
Supreme Court Lottery proposed to expand the Supreme Court to include all of 
the federal appellate court judges, and then to constitute temporary panels of 
nine Justices for short periods.118 The panels would be limited by partisan-bal-
ance requirements, so that no more than five Justices on a nine-Justice panel 
could be appointed by presidents of one political party. The Balanced Bench of-
fered a different set of structural reforms towards the same ends. It imagined 
expanding the Court to fifteen Justices, with five Justices affiliated with each of 
the two leading political parties and an additional five selected for temporary 
service by the other ten through unanimous or near-unanimous consensus.119 
Our goal here is not to defend these proposals in particular. Instead, we wish 
merely to urge potential reformers—including those who share Doerfler and 
Moyn’s concerns—to see the value of structural reforms. We think there is great 
promise in the kinds of structural reforms we favor because they can disempower 
the Court so that it does not exceed its proper role in our democracy while also 
building the kind of Court we need to serve as an effective participant in demo-
cratic governance. To be clear, our argument is not that structural reforms alone 
are the path forward—after all, our own proposals incorporated both structural 
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reforms and external constraints. Our point is that reformers must not dismiss 
structural reforms as a categorical matter. 
We will briefly consider a few examples of structural reforms to illustrate 
their potential. Eric Segall has argued for partisan-balance requirements on the 
Court, with an even number of Supreme Court Justices.120 Taking inspiration 
from the Court’s 4-4 Term after the death of Justice Scalia, in which the Court 
reached more consensus than it had in the seventy years prior,121 Segall notes 
that an even split along party lines would force the Justices to find compromises 
and write narrower opinions. In cases with ideological salience, the partisan-bal-
ance structure builds in conflict and thus forces restraint, compared to the base-
line of partisan majorities exercising their will. 
Note that nothing about partisan-balance requirements formally prevents the 
Court from making broad, substantive decisions—including striking down fed-
eral statutes. The proposal is thus not the same as an external constraint like 
jurisdiction-stripping or a supermajority-voting rule. But at the same time, the 
design itself should—and indeed is intended to—create political dynamics on 
the bench that tend toward narrower and more restrained decisions. Similarly, 
our Balanced Bench proposal sought to prevent the Court from issuing decisions 
wildly out of step with democracy by combining partisan-balance requirements 
with a rule requiring consensus on the appointment of additional temporary Jus-
tices from the lower courts before the Court could function. With such a system, 
random chance no longer could produce a Court that bore little correspondence 
to the results of the political process. 
Other reforms that are being actively considered would also change the 
Court’s structure in order to make it more responsive to democracy in some way. 
Consider proposals for staggered, eighteen-year term limits, of which there are 
many variations in the literature.122 These reforms would provide that each pres-
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idential term would be guaranteed two appointments to the Court, thus ensur-
ing that the Court’s composition over time would more closely track the results 
of presidential elections. This reform would disempower individual Justices, but 
it would not necessarily disempower the Court itself. For that reason it may be 
understandably less attractive to those whose goal is Court disempowerment. 
Consider also more traditional Court expansion (or Court “packing”), in 
which a party currently in power adds seats to the Court for the purpose of gain-
ing partisan advantage. This approach would not appear to disempower the 
Court; it would instead simply keep its formal power constant, while changing 
the composition of its majority in order to shape how that power is exercised. 
But this strategy might have significant consequences for the Court’s power as a 
practical matter. To the extent that the move is seen as illegitimate, it could lead 
to pressure on officials to refuse to follow facially lawful Supreme Court rulings. 
It also could lead to a new set of norms in which each time Congress and the 
White House changed hands, new seats were added to the Court. That develop-
ment might make the Court more democratically responsive, but it could poten-
tially make it less powerful, if its decisions are seen as less permanent. 
Here, again, Doerfler and Moyn’s taxonomy leaves us without the right con-
ceptual vocabulary to distinguish reforms. Some “personnel” reforms, like Court 
expansion, could potentially be disempowering or could keep the Court’s power 
constant. Yet Doerfler and Moyn’s approach looks only to the formal way in 
which a reform operates, without asking the deeper question of how the reform 
might actually affect the Court’s power in practice after implementation. 
Importantly, structural reforms can also be combined with external con-
straints. Take our proposal for the Supreme Court Lottery. As noted, the idea is 
that all of the judges on the federal courts of appeals would be appointed Asso-
ciate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court would hear cases in 
panels of nine randomly selected from its full membership. This design structure 
has much to offer: it would draw judges from all over the country, with greater 
professional diversity, and from a wider set of legal backgrounds. It would also 
lower the stakes significantly of individual confirmation battles, given that any 
one Justice would hear cases on the Supreme Court only occasionally. 
But one might worry that this design would lead to wild fluctuations based 
on panel composition. The partisan-balance requirement would help prevent an 
8-1 conservative court swinging to an 8-1 liberal court. Here is where external 
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constraints can also come into play. Our proposal, for example, would also im-
pose supermajority-voting rules to further rein in the power of a court to strike 
down federal statutes.123 
Doerfler and Moyn’s approach, however, omits the possibility of using struc-
tural reforms to disempower the Court indirectly or combining them with ex-
ternal constraints. Indeed, they ignore the combination of external constraints 
and structural-reform strategies in our proposals. But as we have seen here, 
structural reforms undoubtedly can be restraining. The degree to which they are 
disempowering and the mechanism by which they disempower the Court will of 
course vary depending on the details of the reform. Moreover, structural reforms 
do not suffer from the central drawback we identified with focusing only on ex-
ternal constraints like jurisdiction-stripping. In our legal and constitutional con-
text, we need a Court that can resolve important issues in order to ensure that 
policies are stable. 
conclusion: why democracy needs to reform—and save—
the supreme court 
Our framework for understanding democracy-reinforcing Supreme Court 
reforms has important implications. First, as we have argued, continued debates 
over interpretive methodology are unlikely to be helpful from the perspective of 
advancing democratically-respectful judicial restraint. Versions of Court reform 
along these lines—such as the uniform adoption of a single interpretive meth-
odology like originalism—have been hotly debated for more than a half-century. 
We have reached no consensus about which theory is correct; and even within 
single theories, there are often plausible arguments for various outcomes. More-
over, a realistic understanding of human nature provides strong reasons for 
skepticism that this is, by itself, a useful way to restrain the Court in a democracy. 
External constraints are more promising. Yet they suffer from their own lim-
itations—limitations that deserve greater attention. Even if one primarily hopes 
courts will “get[] . . . out of the way of progressive reform,”124 there is no way to 
get courts entirely out of the way in our constitutional structure without at the 
same time precluding the ability of government to credibly commit to the very 
kinds of policy initiatives that progressives support. As we have shown, pro-
posals such as jurisdiction-stripping run up against severe problems when con-
fronted with either a hostile Court engaged in manipulative statutory interpre-
tation or a future administration bent on ignoring or undermining a policy 
initiative. Proponents of external constraints have not—so far as we are aware—
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offered practical solutions to these difficulties. While some external constraints 
can be useful parts of larger reform packages, they are themselves unlikely to be 
the entire solution. 
The limitations of both internal restraints and external constraints leave us 
with needing to keep structural reforms on the table: changes that seek to design 
a Court that is appropriately deferential to democracy, while also serving as a 
useful partner in governance. There are many possible structural reforms, in-
cluding but certainly not limited to those we have proposed. Each has its own 
advantages and drawbacks, and our goal here is not to argue for any one pro-
posal. But as scholars, commentators, and policymakers think about reforming 
the Supreme Court, they should recognize that structural reforms are critical if 
the goal is ensuring that the Court stays within its appropriate place in a democ-
racy. In other words, the path forward cannot simply be to ask judges to exercise 
restraint or to disempower the judiciary; it must be to save the Supreme Court. 
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